Recent years have seen an extensive, renewed discussion of the role of developing countries in the multilateral trading system. New concepts such as "graduation" have been advanced, while arguments for and against "special and differential treatment" of developing countries have been renewed. The subject of trade relations between developed and developing countries is one of the key elements of the Uruguay Round along with nondiscrimination, the treatment of domestic measures such as subsidies, and the future role of a strengthened GATT (see Anjaria 1986 ).
discuss'd in the context of the preparations for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The purpose of this article is to fill this lacuna.
A fundamental premise of the GATT is that domestic industries must be protected only by "bound" tariffs applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. Thus tariff rates so negotiated in the GATT may not be raised without compensation to, or negotiation with, affected trading partners. Since quantitative restrictions can nullify the effects of such discipline on tariffs, the GATT includes a general presumption against the use of quantitative restrictions. From the outset, however, the balance of payments situation was viewed as justifying an exception to this general presumption.
The developed countries have lowered tariff and nontariff barriers since the GATT was founded and in recent years have avoided all but a strictly temporary use of balance of payments restrictions. By contrast, the developing countries have traditionally maintained high tariff and nontariff barriers, and most continue to do so today. In GATT terminology, developing countries' tariff schedules are often largely "untbound"-that is, most of the tariff rates may Ibe unilaterally raised at any time. 1 Quantitative import restrictions are prevalent, although it is often difficult to determine the extent to which these are considered by the countries resorting to them as necessary for balance of payments or infant industry reasons.
If participation by the developing countries in the GATT negotiations is to be meaningful in terms of more open markets, it will need to involve a greater degree of tariff bindings and/or a lowering of their tariff and nontariff barriers. This will require attention by trade officials to the links between trade policy, external adjustment, and development stratey. If these officials believe that development prospects or balance of payments adjustment are retarded rather than advanced by more open trade regimes, fuller participation in the world trading system by developing countries through their increased acceptance of reciprocal market-access obligations would be difficult to achieve.
The developmental or infant industry provisions of the GATT allow a developing country to provide governmental assistance to establish a particular industry (see Anjaria 1987) . Nevertheless, the record shows that in the forrnal arena very few developing countries have sought to justify their infant industry protection. As of September 1986, only five countries (C6te d'lvoire, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe) had formally invoked the relevant GATT Article XVIII:C. 2 By contrast, about twice as many invoked Article XVIII:B, which deals with the balance of payments provisions for developing countries.
A possible explanation for this paradox is that the GATT has applied relatively 1 . Typically, at least 70-85 percent of imports may be subject to an "unbound" tariff in a developing country. Two notable exceptions among the developing countries in this respect are Chile and Mexico, both of which maintain "bound" tariff schedules at maximum tariff rates of 35 percent and 50 percent, respectively.
2. In the 1950s, releases under Article XVIII:C had been obtained by Cuba, Haiti, India, and Sri Lanka, but few other countries resorted to this provision until rather recendy (see Jackson 1969, p. 655). restrictive notification and compensation requirements for invoking Article XVIII:C, which may have induced some developing countries to leave certain restrictions unapproved. But a more important reason may be that some developing countries find it relatively easy to obtain GATT "cover" for infant industry protection under the guise of "balance of payments" reasons which are invoked more frequently. Thus to deal effectively with infant industry protection in the new round presupposes that clearer distinctions will be drawn between balance of payments and infant industry protection.
Given the prevalence of developing countries' trade restrictions for balance of payments reasons, the treatment of this issue at the Uruguay Round will be critical in shaping the future role of developing countries in the GATT system.
The article analyzes this issue as follows. The historical background to and the main features of the GATT provisions and practice pertaining to balance of payments-induced trade restrictions are described in sections I and II. The main rationale for reconsidering the GATT's approach to balance of payments restrictions is outlined in section III. Section IV suggests some issues that are likely to arise in considering a possible reform of the balance of payments provisions, and section V provides concluding observations.
BACKGROUND TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROVISIONS OF THE GATT
Under the current provisions, subject to established consultation and review procedures by the Contracting Parties, the General Agreement permits member countries to protect their external financial situation by imposing temporary trade restrictions in the face of a balance of payments deterioration. 3 To understand the development of this approach, it is useful to review the historical development of GATT rules and practice and the attitude of the framers of the General Agreement toward trade restrictions.
From the outset it was generally accepted that quantitative trade restrictions to safeguard the international reserves and balance of payments position of a country would need to be built into the framework of the new international trade rules. A basic principle of the Havana charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO) carried over into Article XII of the GATT allows countries to use, but not abuse, import restrictions during a balance of payments crisis. Further, given the dollar shortage faced by European countries in the immediate postwar period, the GATT Articles included a provision (Article XIV) allowing discrimination in the application of trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes. In 1955, the provisions of GATT Article XII were reviewed, but this review did not result in acceptance of the proposal to introduce fixed time limits 3. The form "contracting parties" refers to GATT members acting individually. "Contracting Parties" is used in this article in place of the official GATT usage, "CONTRACTING PARTIES' to refer to actions by signatory countries as a group.
The following paragraphs draw heavily upon Jackson (1969), especially pp. 673-716. after which trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes would be expected to lapse. Although several developing countries participated actively in the negotiations on the Havana charter in the late 1940s, no differentiation in the balance of payments provisions governing developing and developed countries was introduced until 1955. GATT Articles XII and XIV were then amended, and GATT Article XVIII dealing with governmental assistance to economic development was revised. As part of the changes, an explicit balance of payments provision relating to developing countries was introduced in Article XVIII. With the 1955 amendments to the GATT Articles, international surveillance over trade restrictions imposed by developing countries for balance of payments reasons was loosened, and developing countries were thereafter required to consult in the GATT only once every two years rather than once a year as was expected of developed countries that invoked the provisions of Article XII.
By the mid-1960s, industrial countries negotiating under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (CaEcD) and the GATT had virtually eliminated reliance on trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes. 4 The remaining restrictions by industrial countries were no longer justified as balance of payments-induced, but either fell within one of the other GATT exceptions to the general ban on quantitative restrictions-such as for agricultural restrictions-or were submerged into a broader category of "residual restrictions," which proved quite difficult to address despite repeated efforts. Until the mid-1970s, industrial countries introduced trade measures such as import surcharges and advance import deposit requirements for balance of payments purposes, but these were applied for temporary periods. Moreover, international surveillance over such measures was exercised relaltively expeditiously under GATT Article XII or under other provisions and practices in the OECD designed to discourage trade and payments restrictions.
In the GATT, several consultations with industrial countries applying import surcharges or advance import deposit requirements took place in special working parties set up for this purpose. In part, the working parties were considered necessary since Article XII technically permitted only quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons, and not other measures. With the adoption of the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures, all GATT balance of payments consultations were formally integrated under the responsibility of the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions.
By contrast, the position of the developing countries evolved in quite the opposite direction. In addition to the concept of infant industry protection incorporated in Article XVIII:C, the notion of special exemptions from rules became enshrined from the mid-1960s in Part IV of the GATT, which entered into force in June 1966. Entitled "Trade and Development" Part IV obliges developed 4. Between 1958 and 1964 , the number of industrial countries invoking GATT Article XII fell from 14 to 3 (see Eglin 1987). contracting parties to extend special and differential treatment to developing countries on a "best endeavors" basis, while imposing no equivalent obligation on developing member countries.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), with its broad mandate to discuss and advance proposals for improving the developing countries' trade and development prospects, was established in March 1964, and it pressed strongly for generalized tariff preferences. In the IMF this development was reflected in the compensatory financing facility, first introduced in 1963, and then extended and liberalized in 1966. In December 1975, following extensive debate, the facility was again substantially liberalized. More broadly, the commodity price shocks of the early 1970s and the disappointing performance of aid donors led to demands by developing countries for a new international economic order which included, inter alia, suggestions for a link between allocations of Special Drawing Rights and development finance. Thus, from the mid-1960s until about the mid-1970s, trade restrictions by developing countries became part and parcel of the broader questions regarding the responsibilities of the developed countries for the trade, finance, and development requirements of developing countries as a group.
In the environment then prevailing, questions about the usefulness of quantitative restrictions to deal with balance of payments problems were infrequently addressed at the international level. Indeed, when they were, the focus was not always on applying common understandings on which to base trade liberalization by all countries but rather on reinforcing in international rules the special treatment of developing countries. 5 An important contribution of the 1973-79 Tokyo Round negotiations to the subject was the adoption by the Contracting Parties in 1979 of the Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments Purposes. As described below, the Declaration broadened the scope of Articles XII and XVIII to cover trade measures other than quantitative restrictions, such as import surcharges and advance import deposits, and established a somewhat weak presumptionexpressed only in its preamble-that "developed contracting parties should avoid the imposition of restrictive trade measures for balance of payments purposes to the maximum extent possible." In addition, the conditions for the application and surveillance of such trade measures were spelled out more clearly. However, the Declaration left unchanged the basic difference in the degree of international surveillance over such trade measures between developed and developing coun-5. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the Outline of Reform prepared by the IMF'S Committee of Twenty in June 1974 included explicit acknowledgment of the special position of developing countries and of the need to promote their interests. In the area of trade the outline noted: "There will be a strong presumption against the use of controls on current account transactions or payments for balance of payments purposes." It also provided: "Wherever possible developing countries will be exempted from controls imposed by other countries, particularly from import controls and controls over outward long-term investment. The special circumstances of developing countries will be taken into account by the Fund in assessing controls which these countries feel it necessary to apply." tries. Indeed, the economic uncertainties of the 1970s appear to have reinforced the notion in the GATT that the balance of payments difficulties of developing countries were of a recurrent nature and that resort to trade restrictions were an acceptable means of dealing with their external payments problems.
II. PRESENT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROVISIONS AND PROICEDURES
Developed countries invoking Article XII consult in the GATT Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions every year; developing countries invoking Articles XVIII:B consult in the same committee once every two years. The first consultation on invocation is normally a "full consultation" to examine the balance of payments justification for the trade restrictions in question and the nature and modalities of the trade restrictions themselves. A statement that represents an IMF view on the balance of payments situation and prospects and on the policies being adopted by a consulting contracting party to deal with external and internal imbalances forms a main input for the full consultation, together with background documentation provided by the consulting country, the GATT secretariat, and the IMF.
Subsequent consultations with developing countries are normally held under "simplified procedures." These consultations involve no discussion of the trade measures or the balance of payments justification for their maintenance and do not include an IMF statement on the situation. Rather, their objective is to provide members of the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions with information on the balance of payments situation and measures taken by the consulting country, in order to assess whether a further full consultation is necessary. Such a decision depends on the time elapsed since the previous full consultation, the steps the consulting country has taken in response to previous conclusions by the Committee, changes in the overall level or nature of trade measures taken for balance of payments purposes, and on the baLlance of payments situation and prospects.
In most respects, consultations under the two main balance of payments provisions-Articles XII and XVIII:B-are quite similar. (For a more detailed discussion of them, see Anjaria 1987) . The main differences between the two relate to, first, the frequency of the consultations and, second, the nature of the discussion and the conclusions reached by the Committee-with the Article XII consultation giving greater emphasis to early phasing out of the balance of payments restrictions. Country 1974 Country 1975 Country 1976 Country 1977 Country 1978 Country 1979 Country 1980 Country 1981 Country 1982 Country 1983 Country 1984 Country 1985 Country 1986 Article
of the countries which have claimed balance of payments justification during the whole period. For example, over the thirteen-year period covered, full consultations under Article XVIII:B were held most frequently with Brazil., but only on a total of four occasions. With Korea and Yugoslavia, full consultations were held three times each, and with a number of other countries they were held only once. Colombia and the Philippines, which have acceded to GATT since the Tokyo Round, have held one and two full consultations, respectively, in the period since their accession. In the case of four countries, no full consultation has been held during the entire thirteen-year period. 6 No comprehensive and definitive information is available for determining whether or not all GATT member countries that resort to trade measures for essentially balance of payments purposes invoke Article XVIII:B to justify their restrictions in the GATT. Although some informal steps taken in the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions are designed to encourage noninvoking countries to justify apparent balance of payments restrictions under the GATT, by and large the initiative to invoke Article XVIII:B is the responsibility of each GATT member. 7 The possibility that several countries applying restrictions for balance of payments reasons may remain outside GATT surveillance is suggested by table 2.8 At the end of 1985, fifteen developing countries did not invoke GATT balance of payments provisions for the import surcharges or advance import deposit requirements applied by them. 9 Similar information is not readily available on quantitative restrictions maintained or intensified at the end of 19 S5 for balance of payments reasons. Even so, there is a strong case to be made for more careful scrutiny by the GATT of trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes that at present may remain outside the surveillance of the GATT Comrmittee on Balance of Payments Restrictions. 1 0 As the maintenance of trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes may be associated with overvalued exchange rates, the IMF has a particular interest in encouraging the identification of such restrictions and their liberalization." 1 Closer IMF-GATT cooperation might therefore be especially fruitful in this area.
6. At present, full consultations are scheduled for 1987 with Egypt, India, Israel, Korea, and Peru. 7. However, the Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance of Payments Purposes also provides for the reverse notifications.
8. Some of these actions may be exchange measures subject to prior approval of the IMF under its Articles. The IMF'S interest in promoting an open trade and payments system, and its activities in relation to international trade, have been described most recently by Gold (1986) . For an earlier account of the role of the IMF in trade policy issues, see Anjaria and others (1985) , pp. 83-86.
9. The fifteen countries that are not included as consulting countries in table 1 are: Belize, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Uruguay.
10. In accordance with the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, a GATT Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Nontariff Measures initiated an examination of the legal basis of quantitative restrictions. With the launching of the Uruguay Round, this group's work was taken up by the negotiating committees.
11. The objectives of IMF surveillance over the exchange rate policies of member countries are laid Available information regarding the number of items covered in countries that invoke Article XVIII:B is summarized in table 3. Although trade restrictions for balance of payments reasons must by definition be across the board, in most developing countries the proportion of the commodity groups covered by tariffs of which GATT is notified has been relatively small, ranging from only a handful of product categories in some cases to more than 50 percent of the number of Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN) categories in five cases. 1 2 This raises the question of whether specific criteria should be developed to distinguish genuine balance of payments restrictions from other types of trade restrictions, such as those for protective or security reasons, which are more likely to be sector-specific. Although historically the GATT has been concerned about the incidental protective effects of balance of payments restrictions, no attempt has been made to establish a sharp distinction between across-the-board balance of payments restrictions and sector-specific restrictions motivated by other considerations. 1 3 Under Article XVIII:B:10, GATT members have the explicit right to vary the restrictiveness of their balance of payments measures depending upon the "essentiality" for economic development of the products in question. This provision, while not a basis for explicit sectoral differentiation in recent years, tends to cloud the distinction between infant industry and balance of payments protection in developing countries.14 At the conclusion of each full consultation, the Committee on Balance of down in Article IV of the Second Amendment of the IMF's Articles. Here it is noteworthy that one of the principles for IMF surveillance over the exchange rate policies of its members is that "the introduction, substantial intensification, or prolonged maintenance, for balance of payments purposes, of restrictions on, or incentives for, current transactions or payments . .. may give rise to the need for discussion with a member (see International Monetary Fund 1986). 12. Countertrade transactions, which are of growing importance in world trade and partly motivated by balance of payments considerations in some developing countries, are often concentrated in certain product categories. However, these have not been categorized as restrictions for balance of payments reasons in notifications to the GATT. See United States International Trade Commission (1985) for a description of countertrade practices. Huh (1983) and Gold (1986) outline IMF concerns about countertrade, which is similar in some respects to bilateral payments agreements.
13. In 1955, the GATT approved the so-called hard-core waiver, allowing countries a transitional period of exemption from Article XI, which establishes the basic presumption against quantitative restrictions, in "exceptional" circumstances (see Jackson 1969, p. 709). 14. In applying policies on the use of its resources, the IMF is required to make a judgment on what constitutes a trade restriction for balance of payments purposes. The IMF's approval vis-a-vis a member's representation has been described as follows:
A member may declare its intention in imposing a measure is, or is not, to manage its balance of payments. The member's representation is given the benefit of any reasonable doubt, but the Fund reserves the right to pass upon the representation on the basis of the facts. These facts include the rationale offered by the member for its measures, the effect of the measures on the balance of payments and on exchange rates of the currency of the member in relation to the currencies of other members, the member's domestic and external conditions or policies that may explain its choice of the measures, expectations regarding the duration of the measures, and the prevailing practice among members in general with respect to the use of the measures for the purpose of managing the balance of payments.
See Gold (1986) , p. 217. Country 1974 Country 1975 Country 1976 Country 1977 Country 1978 Country 1979 Country 1980 Country 1981 Country 1982 Country 1983 Country 1984 Country 1985 Total
Note: The common GATT-IMF members considered are the common members on June 1, 1986. The definitions of "developing countries" is in accordance with the convention used in IMF, International Financial Statistics. An "X" indicates that a country applied an import surcharge and/or an advance import deposit requirement either through the exchange or trade system usually at the end of the calendar year for which the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (hereafter AREAER) was prepared. An "O" indicates that no such restriction was applied. A series of dashes, "-", indicates the period during which the country was not a member of the iMF. In a few cases, import surcharges are defined here to include additional import taxes not treated as "surcharges" in the AREAER. a. Tunisia acceded provisionally to GATT membership in 1985. Sources: Based on IMF, AREAER, Washington, D.C., various issues. Payments Restrictions adopts a report which is subsequently endorsed, usually without further discussion by the GATT Council. Among the points generally included in the Committee's conclusions are references to the nature of the balance of payments problem and the extent to which the external disequilibrium is seen to be related to trade imbalances; a brief expression of the Committee's general views on the other external and domestic financial policies being pursued to correct the balance of payments problem; where relevant, the application of multiple trade restrictions where a more simplified trade regime might be appropriate; and the incorporation of any announced plans by the consulting country to phase out the restrictions or, in their absence, the Committee's views on the desirability of establishing such a timetable. Following the introduction of more flexible exchange rates worldwide, the IMF finding and the GATT conclusions have generally sought to welcome or encourage a policy stance that is conducive to achieving medium-term viability in the external payments position. Thus in recent years unduly specific conclusions about the "need" for trade restrictions for avoiding a decline in the country's holdings of monetary reserves have been avoided.
III. NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
Major changes in the world economy suggest a need to reexamine the rules governing trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes. First, there is a greater willingness among countries to use macroeconomic policy instruments to deal with external difficulties. Second, greater mobility of capital in the past decade has changed the nature of balance of payments problems facing many developing countries. Third, overlaying the discussion of the trade policies of developing countries is a considerable improvement in the understanding of the links between growth, development, and trade strategy which gives urgency to a reexamination of all arguments in favor of trade barriers. In certain important respects, the IMF'S surveillance over exchange rate policies has been adapted to reflect these changes in the 1970s, while the adaptation of GATT rules and practice has lagged behind. Modernization of the GATT balance of payments provisions would thus be a logical part of the overall strengthening of the GATT system that is now being negotiated. At the same time, it would contribute positively to the achievement of the IMF'S objectives.
It is evident that the balance of payments provisions of the GATT permitting the use of quantitative import restrictions were formulated on the assumption of fixed exchange rates-or at least they presumed that exchange rate adjustments, in the absence of "fundamental disequilibrium,' were undesirable. Following the abandonment of the par value system from the early 1970s, there is a greater awareness of the role of exchange rate policy in balance of payments adjustment. Even if they do not float freely in many developing countries, exchange rates are often actively used for balance of payments adjustment. Hence, a fundamental assumption on which the GATT provisions and practice are based is no longer applicable. Moreover, at the time the General Agreement was formulated, quantitative import restrictions were seen as an appropriate or necessary short-term device to switch the pattern of demand toward home-produced goods while policies to reduce real expenditures to bring about an improvement in the current account balance took effect. 1 ' Today, however, the efficacy of exchange rate adjustments to bring about the necessary reduction in real expenditures is recognized, and even among alternative demand-switching policies, quantitative restrictions are regarded as an inferior policy instrument compared with price-related measures such as import 15 . Even more than a decade ago, however, the "equivalence" of quantitative restrictions (QR) and exchange restrictions for balance of payments reasons was recognized. Thus, a rather radical view advanced prior to the Tokyo Round negotiations by Eric Wyndham-White, former Director General of the GATT, questioned the rationale for dealing with balance of payments restrictions in the GATT: The time has now come to recognize that the provisions relating to the use of QR for balance of payments reasons are inappropriate in what purports to be essentially a trade agreement. Commercial measures adopted exclusively for balance of payments reasons are essentially exchange restrictions applied by a particular technique and should be dealt with as such.
See Wyndham-White (1975). surcharges or advance import deposit requirements. There has de'teloped a certain difference between most governments and the IMF on the one hand and the GATT on the other in their respective attitudes toward the approprijate choice of policy instruments for balance of payments adjustment. Exchang' rate adjustment supported by appropriate macroeconomic policies are generally considered as the "first-best" policy package to deal with a lasting balance of payments deterioration; yet the GATT'S mandate is limited mainly to consideling the legitimacy of quantitative import restrictions. One outcome of the disparate evolution of GATT and IMF disciplines and practices-paradoxic4l, given the commonality of purposes of the two bodies-is that while, as IM1F members, countries are called upon to explain why in particular crisis situatiokls they prefer quantitative restrictions or import surcharges to exchange rate abjustment, as GATT members the same countries have come to expect GATT to swstain the use of such restrictions for balance of payments purposes.
Perhaps the most notable change in balances of payments sibce the early 1970s is the profoundly greater importance of capital movements ilp determining the overall external sector position of any country. In the major ind strial countries, the rapid growth of capital markets and the responsiveness of capital flows across international borders has introduced a new element in tl e balance of payments adustment process. Even under a system of fixed excbktnge rates, a trade restriction may result in a real effective appreciation of the exchange rate through its inflationary impact. But in a world of floating exchatge rates and capital mobility, attempts to improve the balance of payments position through the introduction of trade restrictions are at best unworkable, if not actually counterproductive, as they may induce a compensating appreciatiq(n of the currency of the restricting country. In some cases the current account oI the balance of payments may be said to be "driven" by the capital account, ratiher than vice versa. Restrictions imposed by a major trading nation would aln"ost certainly prove counterproductive by provoking retaliatory restrictions by krading partners. The numerous governmental statements and declarations issupd in the past decade testify to the awareness of policymakers in industrial cotlntries of the dangers of resorting to trade restrictions for correcting payment4 imbalances. For example, in May 1974 the member countries of the OECD adopled a declaration expressing their determination to avoid resort to import restrictions and similar measures, a declaration that has been successively renewed since then.
For developing countries, greater worldwide capital mobility h4s shifted the focus from balance of payments deficits per se to concerns about irtedium-term external viability. Many developing countries which engaged in heavy external borrowing in the 1970s found, in the worsened external economic environment they faced subsequently, that their debt burden became unsustai*able. Major debt restructuring and exceptional financing were coupled with strih.gent adjustment policies to bring the external position closer to medium-term viability. But in no instance was it thought possible or desirable that the objectivc of mediumterm viability could be achieved by increased reliance on trade ab.d payments restrictions. Even where, in the early 1980s, adjustment packages entailed a high degree of initial import compression, reliance was placed mainly on demand management policies, rather than on intensified and prolonged trade and payments restrictions. Over the medium term it was considered necessary to establish the basis for permitting the growth of imports at a sustainable rate by combining exchange rate and demand management policies with appropriate, but often slower acting, supply-side policies. Thus, the "freedom" available to developing countries under the GATT to impose trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes proved to be somewhat irrelevant, as the countries concerned often found it feasible to go beyond reliance on trade restrictions to an active search for policy packages that reduced this reliance.
Another major consideration relates to the links between trade strategy and development. A growing body of evidence demonstrates the positive experience of an outward-oriented trade strategy for developing countries' growth and development prospects. Although work on outward-oriented or export-promoting strategy for promoting economic development started as far back as the 1960s, it was not until the late 1970s that sufficiently extensive analysis was undertaken establishing the superiority of more open (or, strictly, more neutral) trade policy over the import-substitution policy often recommended by economists in the 1950s and 1960s. 16 A number of detailed studies have found that the export-promoting strategy enabled developing countries with an already established industrial base to take advantage of the postwar economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, an opportunity that was missed by countries that pursued an import-substitution strategy. Furthermore, the former strategy was found to be superior in promoting overall economic growth as well as more rapid industrialization and promotion of employment. 1 7 Given these findings, it has been increasingly evident that the cost of using balance of payments difficulties as a justification for maintaining trade barriers is not negligible for developing countries. The view that trade barriers are an inappropriate way to address payments difficulties has thus been further reinforced.
IV. SOME ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE Notwithstanding the clear theoretical as well as practical grounds for reexamining the balance of payments provisions of the GATT, it is premature to predict whether this reexamination will be conducted or how it will be concluded. If 16. The "export-promoting" strategy is something of a misnomer, since the literature defines such a policy as one that maintains an effective exchange rate for exports at a level not significantly different from that of imports. Thus the export-promoting strategy merely calls for eliminating the bias against exports, while the import-substitution strategy is one based on a higher effective exchange rate for imports than for exports. Of course, the maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate is not consistent with pursuit of the export-promoting strategy (see Bhagwati, forthcoming).
17. Two major studies in this area are Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) . See also Bhagwati (forthcoming).
there were to develop a broad consensus for reviewing the GATT provisions and practice, the main issues that may prove difficult in the context of the Uruguay Round are the degree of discipline that should be applied on balance of payments-induced restrictions and the relation of possible reforms in i:his area to other aspects of the GATT system and negotiations.
The discussions will sooner or later involve the specific features or characteristics which would regulate countries' use of trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes. Among the elements that may be included are: whether temporary restrictions would be authorized for predetermined time limits; whether stricter discipline would be imposed on new restrictions than on preexisting ones; how the generalized nature of the restrictions would be defined (for example, a balance of payments restriction must cover at least x percent of a country's imports); and whether the possible inclusion of services and traderelated investment measures in the negotiations would require a corresponding adjustment of the balance of payments provisions.
How would strengthened international surveillance over trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes be exercised? From the standpoint of a country's trading partners in the GATT, it may be desirable to decide whether the country's program for phasing out trade restrictions and implementing adjustment policies is on track or off track. In practice, however, such judgments may be difficult to reach in the GATT context because they bear on macroeconomic developments and policies that are normally covered in the IMF'S consultations with member countries.
In the GATT context, several procedural questions would require resolution. How frequently would the GATT Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions make its determinations, and on the basis of what information, given that balance of payments prospects are often volatile? If a country's adjustment effort were considered "inadequate" in the GATT context, what would be the practical consequences? Could such a declaration trigger retaliatory actions by trading partners? If so, would retaliation not impede, rather than assist, in the attainment of the country's adjustment objectives? If the rules were too strictly formulated, would there be a greater risk of nonreporting of balance of payments restrictions? How would the IMF be expected to cooperate in a strengthened surveillance process, given its traditionally key role in the GATT balance of payments consultations?
Two substantive issues appear critical: the timing of trade liberalization and the trade-finance link. The first issue is the optimal speed of trade liberalization. Actual experience in the developing countries suggests that no hard and fast rules can be applied a priori to the question of whether trade liberalization should be massive and quickly completed, or gradual. On the one hand, an argument can be made that liberalization of restrictions applied for balance of payments reasons requires alternative macroeconomic policy adjustment to be effective. On the other hand, there is some recent evidence that in the majority of liberalization episodes in developing countries in the postwar period, a more rapid liberalization effort than was actually implemented might have proved both feasible and more effective (Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi 1986) . In any event, if countries can be expected to have different timepaths for trade liberalization, how should these fit in the overall timetable of the ongoing trade negotiations?
The second set of issues falls under the rubric of the "links between trade and finance,' and concerns whether some special or additional financial or trade measures are needed to encourage further trade liberalization by developing countries. The financial aspect of these links concerns the availability of external financing; the trade aspect concerns the openness of markets.
Concerns have been voiced, particularly given the economic difficulties currently facing developing countries, that additional external financing must be available to secure the "permanence" of trade liberalization measures by developing countries. As mentioned earlier, because the "binding" of tariffs assumes a special importance in the context of GATT negotiations, it appears quite reasonable, prima facie, to argue that additional external resources should be available to finance any unexpected increase in imports resulting from a developing country's binding commitments under the GATT. For example, if concessional longterm capital flows are directed toward countries which pursue appropriate macroeconomic policies combined with an outward-oriented trade policy, such additional financing may play a very helpful role. The World Bank has recently increased its emphasis on policy-based, quick-disbursing loans for structural and sectoral adjustment, in which trade liberalization often plays a very important part.
Insofar as such suggestions seek to address a possible additional automatic need for balance of payments financing, however, a strong note of caution is in order. In the broadest sense, such financing by the IMF is already tailored to the objective of promoting a liberal trade and payments system. The policies governing the use of IMF resources are established after a careful review of a range of factors, including the global need for balance of payments financing and the quality of programs that the IMF should seek to support. It is questionable whether it would be desirable to establish a specific balance of payments financing feature linked directly to increased imports occasioned by the liberalization effort. Such an open-ended scheme would risk ignoring the essential role of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies in achieving a sustainable mediumterm balance of payments outcome. Such a proposal does not appear to be desirable or feasible.
Addressing the trade aspects of the trade-finance link, it has been argued that if economic growth is to be restored in the context of the balance of payments and debt problems of developing countries, specific and concrete measures must be considered by the industrial countries to improve access for developing countries undertaking trade liberalization with IMF or World Bank financial support. Some policymakers, however, have questioned the justification for limiting any liberalization effort to a relatively narrowly defined group of countries such as "indebted countries" or "countries with IMF or World Bank programs." Their argument has been that if trade liberalization is desirable and feasible, particularly in the so-called sensitive sectors in the industrial countries, the e:ffort should be broad-based and not limited to a few countries. More fundamentally, questions have been raised about how, under such special liberalization, the main GATT principle of nondiscriminatory treatment would be respected. The questions raised by "trade-finance links" will thus not be easily resolved.
Finally how would strengthened GATT provisions and practice in this area fit with the overall program of trade liberalization that is a key objective of the Uruguay Round of negotiations? While bargains will be struck vwith trading partners individually, developed countries' actions in sectors of special interest to developing countries will be important in influencing developing cou ntries' willingness to offer liberalization of balance of payments restrictions. More broadly, since the success of balance of payments adjustment depends crucially on the assurance of open markets abroad, prospects for success in strengthening other key trading rules, such as those on safeguards, subsidies, and quantitative restrictions, will be helpful in strengthening discipline on balance of payments restrictions.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The issues discussed above relating to the role and interest of developing countries in the Uruguay Round form part of a complex array of questions that will be examined in the coming years. A few general ideas deserve to be highlighted in conclusion.
First, it is evident that the GATT treatment of balance of payments restrictions merits a substantive reexamination because the economic premises on which the original approach was founded have largely lost whatever merit they might originally have had. It is now well understood that recourse to trade restrictions to correct the underlying imbalance between output and expenditure may have the effect of inducing compensating exchange rate changes, distorting trade and payments positions among countries, shifting the burden of adjustment to trading partners, and inviting retaliation. There is no basis for believing that trade restrictions can correct balance of payments problems. In addition, consistency of policy would argue for tighter GATT discipline against trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes, the effects of which may be quite similar to exchange restrictions which are disallowed by the IMF. Second, reexamination of the balance of payments provisions of the GATT will in practice need to proceed side by side with consideration of the related issue of infant industry protection. The rationale for long-standing restrictions in the complex and restrictive trade regimes of many developing countries is often unclear. It is difficult to see how the balance of payments provisions of the GATT could be improved and made effective without reconsidering the justification for most other trade restrictions in developing countries as well.
Third, insofar as the GATT's balance of payments provisions are concerned, the division of the world into developed and developing camps-whatever its validity in the late 1940s and the 1950s-appears to be increasingly irrelevant. Prospects for liberalization of trade restrictions in favor of developing countries in markets abroad would be enhanced if discipline on trade restrictions for balance of payments purposes were strengthened in markets of increasing importance to the industrial countries. Developing countries' moves toward more flexible exchange rate arrangements and market-oriented incentives, (making possible a reduced reliance on trade restrictions and on the GATT exceptions which their trade policies receive,) would be facilitated if they expected that there would be a substantial liberalization of trade in their important foreign markets. Whether the industrial countries are prepared to concede the usefulness to them of such a quid pro quo remains to be seen, but in the author's view such a re-orientation deserves careful consideration.
